

Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY OTTAWA NIACT IMMEDIATE

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SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S SPEECH TO BE DELIVERED IN HALIFAX
DECEMBER 8

FOLLOWING IS DEPARTMENT REVISION OF EMBASSY DRAFT OF
AMBASSADOR'S HALIFAX SPEECH.

CANADA, THE UNITED STATES AND ATLANTIC DEFENSE.

1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR WELCOME TO HALIFAX.

2. IN TWO WARS HALIFAX WAS THE HINGE OF THE GREAT EFFORT
TO BRING REINFORCEMENTS AND SUPPLIES FROM NORTH AMERICA
TO EUROPE. IT WAS THIS COOPERATION WHICH, IN AN IMPORTANT

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SENSE, LAID THE FOUNDATIONS FOR THE NORTH ATLANTIC
ALLIANCE.

3. BY ANY MEASURE, THE ALLIANCE HAS BEEN AN EXTRAORDINARY

SUCCESS.

4. FOR 30 YEARS WESTERN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA HAVE BEEN FREE FROM AGGRESSION; AND THEY HAVE BEEN LARGELY IMMUNE FROM POLITICAL PRESSURE EXERCISED BY OUTSIDE POWERS. THE

RESULT HAS BEEN A PERIOD OF SUSTAINED ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOCIAL CHANGE WITHOUT HISTORICAL PARALLEL. THE US AND CANADA HAVE BOTH BEEN MAJOR BENEFICIARIES. NOT ONLY HAVE OUR SOCIETIES BEEN SECURE, BUT OPEN SOCIETIES COMPATIBLE TO OURS HAVE FLOURISHED THROUGHOUT WESTERN EUROPE. TWO GREAT WARS HAD TAUGHT US THAT NEITHER CANADA NOR THE US CAN AFFORD TO LET A HOSTILE POWER DOMINATE WESTERN EUROPE.

5. NOR ARE THE ALLIANCE'S SUCCESSES ONLY IN THE PAST. IT SHOWS NOW STRONG POWERS OF SELF-RENEWAL AND REGENERATION.

6. WE FEARED THE ALLIANCE WOULD FALL VICTIM TO ITS OWN SUCCESS,

--THAT A NEW GENERATION THAT HAD NOT EXPERIENCED THE LESSONS OF HISTORY PRECEDING AND FOLLOWING WORLD WAR II WOULD FAIL TO GRASP THE NEED FOR STRENGTH AND VIGILANCE, AND BE WILLING TO MAKE SACRIFICES FOR THEM,

--THAT IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF GENERAL SECURITY A LACK OF PURPOSE WOULD DEVELOP WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, SAPPING OR EVEN DESTROYING ITS UNITY,

--THAT THE EUROPEANS WOULD NOT CARRY THEIR SHARE OF THE BURDEN, RELYING TOO HEAVILY ON HELP FROM ACROSS THE ATLANTIC, AND THUS ULTIMATELY PUT AT RISK THE PARTNERSHIP ON WHICH THE ENTIRE EFFORT WAS BUILT.

7. SEVERAL YEARS AGO THERE WAS PLENTY OF EVIDENCE TO DOCUMENT THESE FEARS.

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8. YET NOW THE TRENDS ARE POSITIVE. PUBLIC OPINION IN THE US AND EUROPE SHOWS A NEW, WIDENING UNDERSTANDING OF THE NEED FOR STRONG DEFENSE.

9. WHILE TENSIONS OCCASIONALLY FLARE AMONG MEMBERS--GREECE AND TURKEY IS THE MOST SERIOUS RECENT EXAMPLE--THE COHESIVE FORCES UNIFYING NATO REMAIN A CONSTANT UNIFYING ELEMENT. INDEED POLITICAL COOPERATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE HAS SELDOM IF EVER BEEN CLOSER OR MORE FRUITFUL, AS EVIDENT FROM CLOSE ALLIED COORDINATION IN CSCE, MBFR, AND IN EAST/WEST CONSULTATIONS. NO MAJOR ISSUE NOW DIVIDES THE ALLIES.

10. IN 1975, ALLIED MINISTERS PLEDGED TO INCREASE DEFENSE SPENDING IN REAL TERMS TO MEET THE GROWING SOVIET CHALLENGE. SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE TO MEET

THIS PLEDGE, ALTHOUGH MORE OF COURSE REMAINS TO BE DONE, AND EUROPEANS ARE TAKING INCREASING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR OWN DEFENSE. THEY NOW PROVIDE 90 PERCENT OF GROUND FORCES, 75 PERCENT OF THE AIRCRAFT, MOST OF THE SHIPS DEPLOYED IN EUROPE. THEIR DEFENSE SPENDING IS UP 15 PERCENT IN REAL TERMS THIS DECADE.

11. THE ALLIANCE HAS SUCCEEDED, TOO, IN PROVIDING A LARGER FRAMEWORK FOR US/CANADIAN DEFENSE COOPERATION.

12. IN NO FIELD ARE THE DISPARITIES OF SIZE BETWEEN US MORE MARKED THAN IN DEFENSE. GEOGRAPHY REQUIRES DEFENSE COORDINATION, AND OUR BILATERAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS HAVE SERVED US WELL. YET NEITHER OF US WOULD HAVE BEEN AS COMFORTABLE IF WE SHARED ONLY THOSE BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS ALONE. YOU MIGHT HAVE FEARED THAT THE US MIGHT ASSERT EXCESSIVE INFLUENCE ON CANADIAN SECURITY DECISIONS. INDEED AT THE TIME OF THE VIETNAM WAR SOME CANADIANS FEARED (WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION, I SHOULD ADD) THAT WE WOULD TRY TO USE OUR BILATERAL LINKS TO INVOLVE YOU. WE IN TURN MIGHT HAVE FEARED THAT THE CANADIAN PEOPLE MIGHT NOT LONG SUSTAIN A DEFENSE EFFORT THAT APPEARED TO BE ONLY AN APPENDAGE OF THE US MILITARY STRUCTURE.

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13. BUT THESE DILEMMAS FADE IN NATO'S LARGER STRUCTURE. THE US' ROLE IS RELATIVELY SMALLER. THERE IS MORE SCOPE FOR MEDIUM AND SMALL POWERS. THE ALLIANCE PROVIDES FOR BROAD PARTICIPATION IN SUCH KEY AREAS OF DECISION-MAKING AS TARGETTING OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DEPLOYMENT OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES, CONTINGENCY PLANNING.

14. IT IS TRUE THAT THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE IS SURPRISINGLY RESILIENT AND VIGOROUS. BUT IT FACES A VAST NEW CHALLENGE --THE SUSTAINED DRIVE THE SOVIET UNION HAS MOUNTED SINCE THE 1962 CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS TO INCREASE ITS STRATEGIC AND CONVENTIONAL POWER.

15. FOR THE LAST DECADE THE SOVIETS HAVE EACH YEAR INCREASED THEIR DEFENSE SPENDING IN REAL TERMS AT A RATE APPROXIMATING TWICE THAT OF NATO'S.

16. THE SOVIETS NOW DEVOTE 11 TO 13 PERCENT OF THEIR GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT TO DEFENSE. NATO AVERAGES 4-5 PERCENT.

17. NO DOUBT SOME OF THESE DISPARITIES OF EFFORT MUST BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOVIET PERCEPTION OF CHINA AS A GREAT NEW THREAT, AND TO THE RELATIVE INEFFICIENCY OF THE SOVIET MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT.

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18. BUT FAR FROM ALL.

19. TAKE STRATEGIC FORCES FIRST. SINCE 1962 THE SOVIETS HAVE MOVED FROM ONE TO TEN INFERIORITY TO ROUGH EQUIVALENCE IN MANY, THOUGH NOT ALL, STRATEGIC PARAMETERS. THEY HAVE ADVANTAGES IN SOME STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS. NOW THEY ARE INTRODUCING NO LESS THAN FOUR NEW TYPES OF INTERCONTINENTAL MISSILES IN THE LAST TWO YEARS, DEPLOYING NEW LONG-RANGE SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILES.

20. TAKE NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE. WITHIN THE LAST FEW YEARS THE SOVIETS HAVE DRAMATICALLY RECONFIGURED THEIR TACTICAL AIR ARM FROM LARGELY AIR DEFENSE TO PLACE GREATER EMPHASIS ON DEEP PENETRATION, DUAL CONVENTIONAL/NUCLEAR

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OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY. THE USSR IS PREPARING TO DEPLOY FOR THE FIRST TIME A MOBILE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MULTIPLE WAR-HEAD BALLISTIC MISSILE THAT CAN HIT ANY TARGET IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM RUSSIAN TERRITORY.

21. BUT THE MOST IMPORTANT--AND THE MOST SERIOUS--TREND IS THE GROWING POWER OF SOVIET CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

22. SOVIET MANPOWER TARGETTED AGAINST EUROPE IS GROWING--BY 130,000 MEN IN NATO'S KEY CENTRAL REGION ALONE OVER THE LAST DECADE. THESE DIVISIONS HAVE NEARLY TWICE AS MUCH ARTILLERY AS THEY DID, 40 PERCENT MORE TANKS, AND UNPRECEDENTED AIR AND GROUND MOBILITY.

23. AT THE SAME TIME THE SOVIET UNION HAS AT LAST BROKEN OUT OF ITS CONTINENTAL ROLE, AND USED THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOPHISTICATED NAVAL FORCES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA, AND THE ATLANTIC AND THE INDIAN OCEANS TO BECOME A WORLD-WIDE POWER CAPABLE OF EXERCISING FORCE ALMOST ANYWHERE.

24. AND THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT THIS ACCUMULATION OF MILITARY POWER BY THE SOVIET UNION WILL ABATE. ON THE CONTRARY, IT CONTINUES TO BE A STRUCTURAL CONSTANT IN SOVIET POLICIES.

25. WHAT DO THESE SOVIET EFFORTS MEAN FOR US? IT ALMOST CERTAINLY DOES NOT MEAN AN IMMINENT THREAT OF WAR. ALTHOUGH IT IS SHIFTING, THE BALANCE OF FORCE IN EUROPE IS

NOT SO UNFAVORABLE AS TO MAKE ATTACK A TEMPTING OPTION.

26. BUT IT DOES MEAN THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS ACQUIRING
NEW OPPORTUNITIES TO EXERT INFLUENCE IN EUROPE--EITHER

BECAUSE IT WILL BE ABLE WITH LESS FEAR OF RIPOSTE TO
THREATEN ADVENTURISM ON THE EDGES OF THE CONTINENT IN SUCH
PLACES AS YUGOSLAVIA AND THE MEDITERRANEAN--OR BECAUSE THE
GROWING DISPROPORTION OF MILITARY FORCE WILL CREATE A
PSYCHOLOGY OF DOMINATION OR A SENSE OF INABILITY TO COPE IN
WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES THAT MUST SIMULTANEOUSLY
FACE MAJOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHALLENGES AT HOME.

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27. IT MEANS THAT IN THE FUTURE THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
GAINS THAT HAVE SO MARKED THIS GENERATION OF PEACE COULD
BE AT RISK. WHEN WE ARE LIVING IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF
GENERAL SECURITY, DEFENSE AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT TRAD
OFF AT THE MARGIN--YOU CAN GET MORE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT BY
SACRIFICING DEFENSE. BUT SHOULD A CLIMATE OF INSECURITY
DEVELOP AS A RESULT OF DISEQUILIBRIUM OF FORCE, ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL GROWTH COULD BE IN JEOPARDY. WITHOUT SOME
MINIMUM LEVEL OF SECURITY, WE CANNOT PROSPER.

28. WITHOUT PROSPERITY AND REQUISITE STRENGTH THE CURRENT
GENERATION COULD WITNESS A DEVOLUTION OF EUROPE TO A CON-
TINENT UNDER PRESSURE OR DOMINATION FROM POTENTIAL AD-
VERSARIES AND DIVIDED BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY

29. HOW TO DEAL WITH SOVIET POWER HAS BEEN THE CENTRAL
CONCERN OF THE ALLIANCE SINCE IT WAS FOUNDED.

30. BROADLY, THREE COMPLEMENTARY STRATEGIES ARE OPEN TO
US.

31. WE CAN TRY GRADUALLY TO LESSEN THE ADVERSARY CHARACTER
OF OUR RELATIONSHIP BY TRADE, CULTURAL AND OTHER CONTACTS.

32. WE CAN TRY TO LIMIT OR ROLL BACK ARMAMENTS, EITHER
STRATEGIC ARMS--AS IN THE SALT TALKS--OR CONVENTIONAL--AS
IN THE CURRENT TALKS ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUC-
TIONS IN EUROPE--THE SO-CALLED MBFR TALKS.

33. AND WE CAN SEEK TO NEUTRALIZE THE EFFECTS OF INCREASED
SOVIET ARMS BY BUILDING OUR OWN FORCES.

34. CLEARLY WE HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO FOLLOW ALL THREE.

35. GREAT INCREASES IN TRADE AND SOME INSTITUTIONALIZA-
TION OF EXCHANGES IN THE 1975 HELSINKI AGREEMENT HAVE GIVEN

SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE WEST A SOMEWHAT MORE NORMAL CHARACTER. BUT THE SOVIET UNION REMAINS ESSENTIALLY A CLOSED SOCIETY, AND THE SURFACE OF CONTACT IS NOT YET LARGE ENOUGH TO BEGIN TO ALTER THE SECURITY PROBLEM.

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36. NEGOTIATIONS ON ARMS LIMITATIONS, ON THE OTHER HAND, OFFER US SOME HOPE. BOTH THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE COMMITTED TO SEEK A NEW SALT AGREEMENT, WHICH WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE UNCERTAINTIES IN THE FORCE PLANNING OF EITHER SIDE. SPECIFICALLY, A SALT II ACCORD WOULD CONSTRAIN THE SOVIETS TO A LEVEL OF STRATEGIC ARMS WELL BELOW WHAT THEY WOULD DEPLOY IN THE ABSENCE OF AGREEMENT, WHILE LEAVING US FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS AND THE NUCLEAR FORCES OF OUR ALLIES UNAFFECTED. MOVEMENT TOWARDS AN AGREEMENT CONTINUES BUT SOME PROBLEMS STILL REMAIN.

37. LIKEWISE, NO AGREEMENT HAS YET BEEN REACHED IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. THE WEST SEEKS TO ESTABLISH APPROXIMATE PARITY OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE BY SETTING A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING ON THE MANPOWER OF BOTH SIDES BY REDUCING THE DISPARITY IN TANKS. SINCE THE EAST CURRENTLY HAS SUCH A LARGE SUPERIORITY IN MEN AND TANKS, IT WOULD NATURALLY HAVE TO REDUCE MORE THAN THE WEST TO REACH THE COMMON CEILING. THOUGH THE TWO SIDES ARE STILL FAR APART, THERE HAVE BEEN SOME ACHIEVEMENTS. SOME PERSONS HAD FEARED, THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD SPLIT THE ALLIANCE ASUNDER. INSTEAD, THE OPPOSITE HAS OCCURRED--MEANINGFUL AND EFFECTIVE CONSULTATIONS AMONG ALL THE PARTICIPANTS HAVE TAKEN PLACE. THE NATO ALLIES HAVE STRIVEN, WITH REMARKABLE SUCCESS, TO MOLD JOINT POSITIONS THAT TAKE THE INTERESTS OF ALL THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS INTO ACCOUNT. AND CANADA CAN BE PROUD OF ITS CONSTRUCTIVE AND PERCEPTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THESE ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS AND THE WESTERN POSITION IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS.

38. A CERTAIN MAINTENANCE OF WESTERN SECURITY, PURSUIT OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, AND DEVELOPMENT OF MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL AND LESS TENSE EAST-WEST TIES ALL REQUIRE A POSITION OF MILITARY STRENGTH, AND THAT IS PRECISELY WHAT IS UNDER TEST.

39. WE MUST THEREFORE ACT TO INCREASE THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL STRENGTH OF THE ALLIANCE.

40. WHAT DOES THAT MEAN?

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41. IT MEANS THAT WE HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO MAINTAIN A
ROUGH EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN ALLIANCE AND WARSAW PACT FORCES.
WE DON'T, OF COURSE, HAVE TO MATCH ONE FOR ONE. OUR DE-
FENSIVE POSTURE AND DIFFERING TACTICAL DOCTRINES WILL LEAD
TO DIFFERENT DEPLOYMENTS. BUT MAJOR DISPARITIES COULD IN-
VITE SOVIET ADVENTURISM OR THE EMERGENCE OF A PSYCHOLOGY

OF HELPLESSNESS IN EUROPE.

42. PART OF THAT INCREASED STRENGTH CAN COME FROM MORE
EFFICIENT USE OF THE RESOURCES ALREADY AVAILABLE. WE CAN
NO LONGER AFFORD THE LOSS OF EFFECTIVENESS THAT COMES FROM
INCOMPATIBILITIES OF DOCTRINE, FORCE STRUCTURE AND ARMAMENT
BETWEEN NATIONAL FORCES. NATO IS NOW UNDERTAKING A
MAJOR EFFORT:

--TO RATIONALIZE THE COLLECTIVE FORCE STRUCTURE, BY ELIMI-
NATING UNNECESSARY DUPLICATION BETWEEN NATIONAL FORCES.

--TO STANDARDIZE WEAPONS, TRAINING AND LOGISTICS.

43. IMPORTANT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN EACH AREA.
GERMANY AND THE US WILL HARMONIZE COMPONENTS OF THE NEW
MAIN BATTLE TANK. FOUR EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND THE US WILL
PRODUCE AND BUY THE SAME NEW LIGHT FIGHTER. WE HAVE SUB-
STITUTED A NEW COMBAT BRIGADE IN GERMANY FOR A LIKE
NUMBER OF SUPPORT PERSONNEL, AND WILL SHORTLY ADD ANOTHER
SUCH BRIGADE.

44. PART OF THE RESOURCES MAY ALSO COME FROM NATIONAL
ACTIONS TO ELIMINATE WASTE IN THEIR MILITARY SPENDING.
PRESIDENT-ELECT CARTER HAS PLEDGED TO GIVE THIS HIGH
PRIORITY IN HIS ADMINISTRATION.

45. BUT WE MUST LOOK TO OUR DEFENSE BUDGETS AS WELL. THE
US PASSED THIS FALL--WITH OVERWHELMING CONGRESSIONAL
SUPPORT--A RECORD DEFENSE BUDGET, UP ALMOST SIX PERCENT IN
REAL TERMS FROM LAST YEAR. MOST OTHER ALLIANCE MEMBERS
ARE ALSO INCREASING REAL SPENDING, ALTHOUGH IN LESSER
DEGREE.

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46. AN IMPORTANT LESSON TO BE DRAWN FROM THE PRESENT
MILITARY REALITIES IN EUROPE IS THAT THE CONTRIBUTIONS TO
THE COMMON DEFENSE OF THE MEDIUM-SIZED AND SMALLER ALLIES
ARE MORE CRITICAL THAN EVER BEFORE. AS ALWAYS, DECLINING
DEFENSE EXPENDITURES BY SOME CAN SAP THE WILL AND THE
DOMESTIC POLITICAL BASE WHICH SUPPORT CONTINUING COMMIT-
MENTS ON THE PART OF OTHERS. BUT BEYOND THIS, GROWING
SOVIET CONVENTIONAL STRENGTH IN AN ERA OF APPROXIMATE

NUCLEAR PARITY BETWEEN THE US AND USSR MAKES EACH ALLIES' CONTRIBUTION THE MORE IMPORTANT, EVEN AT THE MARGIN.

47. LIKE OTHER ALLIANCE MEMBERS CANADA IS RESPONDING TO THE NEW REALITIES, DECIDING A YEAR AGO TO INCREASE

SPENDING ON MILITARY CAPITAL EXPENDITURES BY 12 PERCENT IN REAL TERMS A YEAR FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE DECADE.

48. THIS CANADIAN DECISION AFFECTS ONLY A PART OF THE WHOLE DEFENSE BUDGET. BUT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO OVER-ESTIMATE ITS IMPORTANCE OR ITS DIFFICULTY, COMING AT A TIME OF AUSTERITY AND THE IMPOSITION OF PRICE AND WAGE CONTROLS. FRANKLY, YOUR ALLIES HAVE BEEN CONCERNED THAT CANADA, THE ALLIANCE'S MOST PROSPEROUS COUNTRY SHOULD DEVOTE A LESSER SHARE OF ITS RESOURCES TO DEFENSE THAN EVERY MEMBER BUT ONE.

49. IN THIS REGARD IT IS TO BE HOPED THAT CANADA WILL ALSO DECIDE TO INCREASE ITS OVERALL MILITARY BUDGET--NOT BY THE SAME PROPORTIONS--BUT BY ENOUGH TO PREVENT THESE HIGH INCREASES IN EQUIPMENT SPENDING FROM STARVING ORDINARY OPERATIONAL NEEDS.

50. WHAT DO THESE NEW TRENDS MEAN FOR CANADIAN/US DEFENSE RELATIONS?

51. THEY MEAN THAT CANADIAN RE-EQUIPMENT DECISIONS--THOSE ALREADY TAKEN SUCH AS THE NEW AURORA LONG-RANGE PATROL AIRCRAFT, OR THE NEW LEOPARD TANKS AND ARMORED PERSONNEL LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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CARRIERS, OR THOSE TO COME, SUCH AS THE REPLACEMENTS FOR YOUR CF-104 AND CF-101 FIGHTERS AND NEW SHIPS FOR THE NAVY--HAVE AN ALLIANCE-IMPACT AND ARE ATTRACTING ALLIANCE-WIDE INTEREST AS NEVER BEFORE. WE UNDERSTAND THAT CANADA MUST--AS MUST ALL COUNTRIES--MAKE SURE THAT ITS PROCUREMENTS FULFILL SOVEREIGNTY AS WELL AS COMMON DEFENSE NEEDS. WE KNOW ALSO THAT YOUR DECISIONS WILL BE INFORMED BY THE SPECIAL NEEDS OF PEACEKEEPING, TO WHICH CANADA HAS MADE A LARGER COMMITMENT OF FORCES THAN ANY OTHER COUNTRY.

52. THEY MEAN THAT WE BOTH HAVE AN INTEREST IN RETAINING JOINT BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS--NORAD IN PARTICULAR--THAT ARE DEMONSTRABLY MORE EFFICIENT THAN SEPARATE ARRANGEMENTS TO THE SAME PURPOSE. HOWEVER WE MUST BE WILLING TO CONSIDER MODIFICATIONS WHERE NEEDED.

53. THEY MEAN THAT CANADIAN PARTICIPATION CAN HAVE AN

IMPORTANT IMPACT ON THE WAY OTHER ALLIES AS WELL WILL RESPOND TO SUCH ESSENTIAL NATO PROJECTS AS THE AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM.

54. THEY MEAN THAT WE SHOULD MAKE YET FULLER USE OF OUR DEFENSE PRODUCTION SHARING AGREEMENT--A UNIQUE "COMMON MARKET" IN DEFENSE GOODS THAT CAN HELP BOTH COUNTRIES

ACHIEVE THE INCREASES IN EFFICIENCY THAT WE BOTH MUST NOW HAVE.

55. THERE IS NO GOOD TIME TO HAVE TO MEET AN OUTSIDE CHALLENGE TO OUR SECURITY. THERE ARE ALWAYS HUMAN TASKS WITHIN YOUR SOCIETY--AND OURS--TO WHICH WE WOULD WISH TO GIVE PRIORITY: THE ENDING OF SOCIAL INJUSTICE, THE RESOLUTION OF SOCIAL CONFLICTS. YET IN AN ULTIMATE SENSE OUR ABILITY TO MEET INTERNAL CHALLENGES DEPENDS ON OUR ABILITY TO MEET THOSE COMING FROM OUTSIDE.

56. NO COUNTRY NOT DIRECTLY ATTACKED HAS EVER FURNISHED THE EFFORT OF SACRIFICE AND VALOR CANADA DID IN TWO WORLD WARS. YOU WILL ALWAYS BE ADMIRER FOR THAT. THE LINKS OF LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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CONFIDENCE FORMED THEN BETWEEN CANADA, THE US AND EUROPE LIE AT THE HEART OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE.

57. THEY ALSO LIE AT THE HEART OF THE UNIQUELY CLOSE DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. EVER SINCE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE IN 1940 WE HAVE PURSUED COLLECTIVE SECURITY NOT ONLY IN THE NATO CONTEXT, BUT ALSO FOR THE NORTH AMERICAN CONTINENT.

58. OVER THE YEARS WE HAVE NOT ONLY KEPT THE PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE ALIVE, BUT HAVE ESTABLISHED OTHER CONSULTATIVE ORGANS SUCH AS THE MILITARY COOPERATION COMMITTEE AND THE CANADA-US REGIONAL PLANNING GROUP, AND HAVE SET UP JOINT COMMANDS SUCH AS NORAD. AS A MATTER OF FACT THERE ARE OVER 250 AGREEMENTS RELATING TO DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN CANADA AND THE US. THERE IS ALSO A LARGE AND ACTIVE MILITARY EXCHANGE PROGRAM. AND LAST BUT NOT LEAST THERE IS THE DEFENSE PRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT SHARING PROGRAM.

59. THE EXPERIENCE OF OUR DEFENSE COOPERATION HAS BEEN A POSITIVE ONE, AND I AM HAPPY TO BE ABLE TO SAY THAT BOTH OUR GOVERNMENTS REMAIN CONVINCED THAT SUCH COOPERATION, CONDUCTED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, REMAINS VITAL TO THEIR MUTUAL SECURITY, COMPATIBLE WITH THEIR NATIONAL INTERESTS AND AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO THE OVERALL SECURITY OF THE NATO

AREA. AS NEIGHBORS AND ALLIES WITHIN NORTH AMERICA,
CANADA AND THE US HAVE ACCEPTED SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
FOR THE SECURITY OF THE CANADA-US REGION OF NATO.

60. SO CANADIAN DEFENSE EFFORTS NOT ONLY WORK TO ASSURE
NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND PROVIDE VALUABLE SERVICES TO

WORLD PEACE THROUGH CONTRIBUTIONS TO UN PEACEKEEPING
EFFORTS, BUT ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO THE VIABILITY OF NATO AND
THE DEFENSE OF NORTH AMERICA.

61. CANADIAN FORCES IN EUROPE MAKE A VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION
IN MILITARY TERMS AND HAVE CONSIDERABLE SYMBOLIC
IMPORTANCE AS WELL. CANADA MAKES A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO
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NATO'S NAVAL AND MARITIME PATROL CAPABILITY. AND, FINALLY,
EFFECTIVE DEFENSE OF NORTH AMERICA CONTRIBUTES TO NATO'S
DETERRENT POSTURE.

62. WE HAVE BEEN ALLIES FOR A LONG TIME. THE REAL
MEASURE OF OUR COMMITMENT TO EACH OTHER IS THAT NOW, WHEN
WE MUST FACE NEW CHALLENGES WE FIND THE ALLIANCE AMONG
US RESILIENT AND STRONG. KISSINGER

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